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OPEN SOURCE BIOLOGY: A MEANS TO
ADDRESS THE ACCESS & RESEARCH GAPS?
Katherine M. Nolan-Stevauxt
Abstract

Although Americans enjoy access to a wide range of drugs to
treat all types of diseases, ranging from life-threatening to lifesustaining, numerous serious illnesses existfor which either there are
no drugs available or worse the drugs that do exist are not available
in a particular marketplace, such as the developing world. This
articlefocuses on how an open source licensing system premised on
patent law can foster drug development to benefit the developing
world. The first section discusses the access and research gaps and
explains how patents, in part, contribute to these gaps. The second
section briefly explains open source licensing practices in software
before discussing why an open source approach attracts biomedical
researchers and how it might differ from open source approaches in
software. The third section evaluates existing open source biology
projects that fall into two approaches. The fourth section compares
open source approaches to other alternativepatent-basedapproaches
and concludes that an open source model provides the best incentives
to reduce access and research gaps. The last section concludes that
an open source approach is a viable alternative to current licensing
strategies and suggests that open source licensing of patent pools
provides the best incentive to promote downstream drug development.

t Associate, Pooley & Oliver, LLP; J.D. University of California, Berkeley Boalt Hall School of
Law, 2006; Ph.D., Harvard University, 2000. 1 would like to thank Pilar Ossorio, Virginia
Zaunbrecher, and Carol Johns for comments and support and Laura Mason for research
assistance. All opinions expressed are mine alone and should not be attributed to Pooley &
Oliver.
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INTRODUCTION

Americans enjoy access to a panoply of drugs to treat conditions
ranging from the life-threatening (cancer) to the lifestyle-sustaining
(erectile dysfunction). In contrast, numerous serious illnesses exist for
which there are no drugs available, or worse yet, the drugs exist but
not in a particular marketplace, such as the developing world.' The
lack of access to existing medicines in the developing world and the
lack of development of new medicines can be divided into two
classes. First, access to these medicines depends upon selecting drug
formulations optimized for the developing world, assuring adequate
financing to sustain drug supply, pricing drugs within reach for
developing countries, and guaranteeing the presence of an effective
health and supply system.2 Second, in many cases both the access and
pharmaceutical development problems are exacerbated by current
patent licensing practices. 3 While international law may address
partially the first problem,4 this article will focus on how an open
source licensing system premised on patent law can foster drug
development to benefit the developing world.
In general, the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries
protect their drugs through patents. However, most commentators
suggest that these industries are most at risk of hindered research due
to either the development of a patent anticommons or a patent
thicket.5 For example, despite the need for a malaria vaccine, patents
may block its development: one malaria-derived protein that could be
targeted by a vaccine is subject to thirty-four patents. 6 Thus, to ensure
freedom to operate, researchers must first negotiate with all the rights'
holders prior even to developing or testing whether a vaccine against
that particular protein might be effective. Similarly, in the realm of
agricultural technology, two foundational patents related to transgenic

1. See generally Amy Kapczynski, Samantha Chaifetz, Zachary Katz & Yochai Benkler,
Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations,
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1089 (2005).
2.
Alicia Ely Yamin, Not Just a Tragedy: Access to Medications as a Right under
InternationalLaw, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 325, 327 (2003).
3.

See infra Section II.B.

4.

Yamin, supra note 2, at 327.

5.

See infra Section II.B.2.

6.
Arti K. Rai, ProprietaryRights and Collective Action: The Case of Biotechnology
Research with Low Commercial Value, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER IN A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 288, 295 (Keith E. Maskus &

Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) [hereinafter Rai, ProprietaryRights].
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crop technologies are held by different commercial entities 7 who,
while willing to license to developed world, have thus far not licensed
these technologies to the developing world to improve their
agricultural production.
Researchers concerned with these issues are turning to open
source licensing as a solution. Springing from the software
community, open source projects are growing in the biotechnology
arena. 8 Some of these projects displace patents altogether by
depositing information in the public domain with free access. 9 Other
projects, still eschewing patents, employ licensing terms to ensure
public availability of information while it is still being gathered.' 0
Finally, some projects couple patents with open-licensing terms."
This article investigates current open source biology projects
with an eye to identifying those that are most likely to stimulate
downstream research to increase access to pharmaceuticals
worldwide. Section II discusses the access and research gaps and
explains how patents, in part, contribute to these gaps. Section III
briefly explains open source licensing practices in software before
discussing why an open source approach attracts biomedical
researchers and how it might differ from open source approaches in
software. Section IV evaluates existing open source biology projects
that fall into two approaches. The first approach aims to create a
commons in which a group of researchers freely shares data and
reagents without licenses.' 2 The second approach leverages
intellectual patent protection through the use of particular license13
terms to ensure that patent rights do not impede drug development.
Section IV also provides an analysis of the licenses to see whether
they are enforceable and if so, whether they promote downstream
research to address the access issue. Section V compares open source
approaches to alternative patent-based approaches and concludes that
an open source model provides the best incentives to reduce the
access and research gaps. Finally, this article concludes that an open
source approach is a viable alternative to current licensing strategies
and suggests that open source licensing of patent pools provides the
best incentive to promote downstream drug development.
7.

Id. at 296.

8.

See infra Section IV.

9.

See infra Section IV.A.2.a.

10.

See infra Section IV.A.2.a.

11.
12.

See Rai, ProprietaryRights, supra note 6, at 296.
See infra Section IV.A.

13.

See infra Section IV.B.
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II.BACKGROUND
First, this section discusses briefly two ways in which the current
biotech and pharmaceutical strategies fail to provide for world health
needs. Second, this section outlines how traditional patent practice
exacerbates these failures. Third, this section describes how open
source methods might be used to address the lack of available drug
products.
A.

The Problem: CurrentAccess and Research Gaps Create
Obstacles to Global Drug Development

If current medicines were available to all who need them, then
approximately ten million lives could be saved worldwide. 14 Thus,
despite medical advances, a significant gap exists between those with
access to available medicines and those without such access. The
access gap is defined as those who lack such access.
Many factors contribute to the access gap. In part, the level of
local pharmaceutical production and local public health infrastructure
determine whether a country can meet its own pharmaceutical needs
at a lower cost. 15Insurance and government-associated health care
systems shield many in the developed world from the high cost of the
medicines whereas such shields do not exist for those in the
developing world.16 Thus, in the developed world, there is little
pressure from the public to decrease the cost of drugs, as patients do
not feel their true cost. Finally, even when countries in the developing
world achieve access to existing pharmaceuticals, the lack of
development itself can stymie efforts to treat the affected
population. 17 Many formulations of medicines require refrigeration,
treatment in hospitals, or other factors that prohibit the ability of those
8
in the public health system to easily distribute treatments.'
In addition to the access gap, a research gap exists. Current
research and development programs in biotechnology and
pharmaceutical companies largely focus on managing the illnesses
endemic to developed life, such as cancer, diabetes, and obesity,
14.

Kapczynski et al., supra note 1,at 1046.

15.

See id.at 1049-50.

16.

Seeid at 1047-48.

17. Press Release, European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Association,
Infrastructure: The Major Obstacle to Healthcare in the Developing World (June 4, 2002),
http://www.e fpia.org/3_press/040602.pdf.
18.

See Kapcyznski et al., supra note 1, at 1051 (describing lack of available heat-stable

forms of essential medicines like insulin); European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and
Association, supranote 17.
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among others.' 9 Thus, between 1975 and 1999, one percent of
medications introduced targeted diseases that cause approximately
twelve percent of the global health burden. 20 Thus, even if the access
gap decreased, significant disparities in public health would still exist
between the developed and developing world. The research gap is
defined by the significant differences in the types of diseases for
which drug companies are developing treatments and those diseases
2
that are not the focus of the majority of drug development programs. '
B. Patents Affect Access and Research Gaps in Drug
Development Worldwide
Multiple factors underlie both the access and research gaps most
of which are beyond the scope of this Paper. However, market
failures underlie both the access and research gaps. Accordingly,
proposals that aim to reduce the costs of existing drugs or that reduce
research-associated costs can diminish the scope of both the access
and research gaps. Patent rights contribute to the market failures,
albeit in different respects. The following subsections explore how
patent rights affect the research and access gaps.
1. Market Exclusivity Contributes to the Access Gap
Patents provide inventors with a limited monopoly on any
products developed using the patented technology. Consequently,
patents often increase the cost of such products because of the limited
market exclusivity that they provide. In the pharmaceutical industry,
when a generic product comes on the market, the cost of the drug to
the public can decrease by twenty-five percent. 22 For example, in
1994, the presence of available generic alternatives for brand-name
drugs saved U.S. consumers approximately $8-10 billion.2 3
Even where patent-protected drugs are theoretically available
worldwide, often the disparities in income place the drug out of reach

19.
See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PUBLIC HEALTH,
INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 28-29 (2006), available at
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.pdf

(discussing disparities in research programs).
20.

Kapczynski et al., supra note 1, at 1051.

21.
Seeid. at 1051-52.
22.
Barbara J. Williams, A Prescriptionfor Anxiety: An Analysis of Three Brand-Name
Drug Companies and Delayed Generic Drug Market Entry, 40 NEW. ENGL. L. REV. 1 (2005).
23.

Id. at 1-2.
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for the developing world. 24 For example, a heat-stable version of an
anti-HIV drug is available in the U.S. for a wholesale price of nearly
$10,000.25 Even if this drug were sold in Africa, few could afford to
purchase it, because in 2004, per capital income in Africa ranged
from $90-4450.26 Only one source manufactures this drug, so there is
little incentive for the company to reduce the price. Consequently,
many organizations concerned about global health have deemed
generic competition the most important mechanism by which to
address the access gap.27 This article explores other alternatives that
result in a lower cost end product.
2.

Patent-Related Transaction Costs Can Inhibit Research

Both the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries rely
heavily on patent protection. 28 Most drug formulations would be
relatively simple to reverse engineer and thus, without a guarantee of
limited exclusivity, companies would have few incentives to invest in
the expensive research and clinical trials necessary to bring new drugs
to market. 29 Accordingly, with the availability of patent protection,
these industries have developed further than otherwise possible.30
Without patent protection, the public would be denied many of the
currently available drugs as a result.
However, the profusion of patents, particularly in the
biotechnology arena, creates problems for future downstream research
as well. 3' Two of the most discussed problems concern the existence
of patent thickets and anticommons. First, the development of so
many patents claiming different aspects of biotechnology products
24.

See Kapczynski et al., supra note 1, at 1047.

25.

Press Release, Mddecins Sans Frontires, Access Denied to Crucial New HIV/AIDS

Medicines (March 15, 2006),
http://www.accessmed-msf.org/prod/publications.asp?scntid= 1532006103467&contenttype=
PARA.
26.

Finfacts, Global Income Per Capita,

http://www.finfacts.com/bizl0/globalworldincomepercapita.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
27.

Kapczynski et al., supranote 1, at 1048-49.

28.
See J. Jason Williams, Protecting the Frontiers of Biotechnology Beyond the
Genome: The Limits of Patent Law in the Faceof the Proteomics Revolution, 58 VAND. L. REV.

955, 984 (2005); Kapczynski et al., supra note 1,at 1045.
29.

See Kapczynski et al., supranote 1, at 1045.

30. Williams, supra note 28, at 985 (discussing argument that removing patent protection
would remove all value in the research). A detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope
of this article.
31.
See Janice M. Mueller, Public Access Versus Proprietary Rights in Genomic
Information: What is the Proper Role of Intellectual Property Rights?, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL'Y 222, 231 (2003).
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creates a patent thicket. 32 Many patents state broader claims than the
actual product that an inventor has developed; consequently, multiple
patents may cover the same area of technology. 33 When multiple
patentees can lay claim to similar territory, a thicket of existing patent
rights develops.

34

One can visualize a patent thicket as the horizontal

ordering of concurrent patent rights some of which overlap in scope.
In order to practice an invention within a patent thicket, a developer
must obtain rights from each patent holder to ensure the freedom to
operate. If patent scope were to be narrowed, either by the PTO or by
courts, the patent thicket problem would diminish.3 5
Second, the profusion of patents may give rise to an
anticommons problem. In other words, the number of rights
themselves impedes the development and marketing of new
products.3 6 Those who argue that an anticommons in biotechnology
exists focus on the numerous patent applications filed on gene
fragments (such as ESTs) and patents on the genes encoding cell
surface receptors and the proteins themselves which may be necessary
to use in order to screen pharmaceuticals targeting that receptor. 37 In
this example, in order to develop the pharmaceutical, the inventor
must obtain a license for the use of both the gene and the protein in
order to develop a small molecule inhibitor of the receptor. Such a
situation represents a "pure" anticommons problem: multiple, nonoverlapping rights must be obtained in order to develop an additional
non-overlapping right. 38 However, blocking patents also contribute to
an anticommons problem. 39 In the previous example, if there was an
additional patent on an expressed tag sequence (EST) corresponding
to the cell surface receptor, no one could use a patent on the gene
32.
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1614 (2003).
33.
34.

See id
See id. The semiconductor industry represents one of the best models of a patent

thicket, in which cross-licenses among many parties are necessary to bring a product to market.
Id
35. Id. at 1627.
36. Id. at 1611.
37. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998); see also Burk & Lemley,
supra note 32, at 1624-27 (presenting biotechnology as the classic anticommons example). After
In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the risk of anticommons developing on ESTs
seems to have diminished as all such applications will have to have foreseeable uses for
particular genes or diseases. Reach-through license agreements give the patent holder rights in
subsequence downstream research.
38. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 699.
39. Id.
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sequence of the cell surface receptor without also obtaining rights to
the ESTs.
Moreover, licensing practices can exacerbate the development of
an anticommons. For example, many licensors seek to obtain rights
on the licensee's downstream research on the licensed technology. 4 °
Thus, even when a licensee develops new technology, she may not
own it. Consequently, innovators unable to obtain ownership of a
particular invention may forgo research in a particular area altogether
in favor of research in a less patent-dominated domain or must run the
risk of infringement litigation.4 ' Because the Bayh-Dole Act
encouraged patenting on early upstream research at roughly the
beginning of the molecular biology revolution, patents exist on many
fundamental technologies and the number of entities possessing
patent rights has dramatically increased.4 2 In addition, the
anticommons problem may develop due to other intellectual property
rights or restrictive licensing regimes, such as.restrictive access to a
database required for downstream research.4 3
The development of an anticommons increases transaction costs
because the necessary patent rights are often held by multiple parties
who are difficult to locate and may be reluctant to bargain with a
downstream inventor.4 4 If one party refuses to license, she may
effectively demand a payment equal to the value of the whole
project.45 Thus, many commentators are concerned that the current
fragmentary patent landscape in biotechnology inhibits downstream
invention, therefore, preventing the development of new drugs. 46 The
mechanisms through which such stifling occurs include the higher
transaction costs of bundling together fragmentary rights, the
heterogeneous interests of disparate rights' holders, and cognitive
biases that result in overvaluing of the rights held by the owner. 47 Not
40.

Id. For more explanation on reach-through licensing, see infra Section III.C.

41.

However, in terms of neglected and orphan diseases, this approach is likely to be

beneficial, as most biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies have not yet been
tremendously interested in these areas. Thus, there may be relatively few patents to license. But,
experience with malaria vaccine suggests otherwise. See supra note 6.
42.
Megan Ristau Baca, Barriers to Innovation. Intellectual Property Transaction Costs
in Scientific Collaboration,2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 4, 19 (2006),

http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/dltr/articles/PDF/2006DLTROO04.pdf.
43. Comments on Heller & Eisenberg by Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan,
http://www.sciencemag.org/feature/data/980465/cook-deegan.dtl (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
44. Burk and Lemley, supra note 32, at 1611.
45. Id. at 1611-12.
46. Id. at 1611.
47. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 700-01.
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all commentators believe that an anticommons problem exists in
biotechnology, given the fact that most research tools are widely
48
licensed and that many researchers can invent around patents.
Nonetheless, the existence of an anticommons would have a profound
impact on research to develop drugs for neglected and orphan
do not have the resources
diseases, as traditionally, these researchers
49
to cope with increased transaction costs.

III. OPEN SOURCE BIOLOGY COMPARED TO OPEN SOURCE
SOFTWARE
Given that the traditional open source movement concerns
software, which is primarily protected through copyright, it is not
intuitively obvious that open source methods can apply to products
that are subject to the patent regime. This section considers why open
source biology is particularly attractive now as a mechanism to
promote access and development of new medicines to underserved
communities. Next, this section outlines the criteria crucial to the
implementation of an open source ideal and examines whether it can
be applied in a biological context. Finally, this section describes what
open source biology and biotechnology will look like, given that these
fields rest on patent instead of copyright law.
Why The Open Source Model May Be A PotentialSolution
Borrowing the open source model from the software movement
may enable researchers to improve the efficiency of research and
decrease the transactions costs involved. The open source model
advocates claim that their approach enables production of higher
quality software at a faster 50rate and at a lower cost than in the
commercial software context.
Traditionally, the open source movement required that software
source code (i.e. human readable code, as opposed to binary object
A.

48.

See generally David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent

Policy, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985 (2005). Indeed, at the time of the Heller & Eisenberg
article, Science invited commentary, and two patent practitioners with Ph.D.s disagreed with
their analysis. Comments on Heller & Eisenberg by Rochelle K. Seide & Janet M. MacLeod,
http://www.sciencemag.org/feature/data/980465/seide.dtl (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) (stating
that the number of owners and potentially blocking patents were overstated and that existing
foundational patents had not blocked downstream research).
49. See Rai, ProprietaryRights, supra note 6, at 289.
50. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, How Copyleft Uses License Rights to Succeed in the Open
Source Software Revolution and the Implicationsfor Article 2B, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 179, 181

(1999).
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51
code) was made openly available to the public to improve upon it.
Communities of programmers, many of whom worked in private
industry, often modified software in an effort to improve code and
develop it more rapidly than commercial practice allowed.52 Thus, the
open source movement began as a means of improving products and
promoting access to those products.
Contrary to public perception, open source depends on the
availability of intellectual property law to protect the product. 53 To
maintain public access to software developed under an open-source
model, the developer must choose an open-source licensing model.
Today, different organizations advocate different licensing strategies.
Licenses approved by the Open Source Institute (OSI) permit further
free distribution of software modifications as part of other software
from other sources and permit restrictions on distribution of modified
source code. OSI-approved licenses also forbid restrictions as to field
of use in source code licenses. The rights under licenses approved by
OSI apply to all without the need for additional licenses and are not
dependent on using the licensed software only as part of a large work
of software.5 4 In contrast, licenses approved by the Free Software
Foundation (FSF) insist that any modifications must remain open or
non-proprietary. 55 This provision is commonly referred to as a
copyleft provision and it ensures that the code licensed under the
copyleft remains under that particular license.
Two of the most common licenses are the General Public
License ("GPL") and the Berkeley Software Distribution License
("BSD"). The former is a copyleft license: it is "intended to guarantee
your freedom to share and change free software-to make sure the

51.
Christian H. Nadan, Open Source Licensing: Virus or Virtue?, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 349, 352 (2002). See also Arti K. Rai, "Open and Collaborative" Research: A New Model
for Biomedicine, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES 131, 137
(Robert W. Hahn ed., 2005) [hereinafter Rai, Open & Collaborative Research].
52.

See Nadan, supra note 51, at 352-53, 373 & n.96 (stating that one of the three top

open source code-producing entities is for-profit).
53.
See Gomulkiewicz, supra note 50, at 185-86; see also David McGowan, Legal
Implications of Open- Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241 (2001).
54.

Nadan, supra note 51, at 356. Thus, the BSD and GPL licenses meet the criteria

outlined by the OSI. Id. at 357.
55. Id. at 357. FSF focuses on the freedom to run a program for any purpose, to access
the source code and modify it, to redistribute copies of the program, to release modification to
the public, and to ensure that the code is not taken private. The Free Software Foundation, The
Free Software Definition, http://www.fsf.org/licensing/essays/free-sw.html (last visited Nov. 12,
2006). It is important to distinguish copyleft from viral provision: the former ensures that the

code and the licenses run together; the latter many that any code into which an open source code
is inserted becomes completely open source. Nadan, supra note 51, at 360.
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software is free for all its users., 56 In contrast, the BSD is simpler and
less restrictive than the GPL. Anyone is free to use the BSD code as
long as the required notices are passed along with the code.57
However, unlike the GPL, BSD-licensed code may be taken private,
since proprietary software that includes the BSD notice can
be
58
distributed in object code so that it may be maintained in secret.
B. Biomedical ResearchersAre Embracing Open Source Ideals
The success of the open source software movement has led those
outside the software field to wonder whether the open source
approach can be applied to other technologies. The open source
model attracts researchers in various fields of biology for a complex
set of reasons. For some, the appeal of an open source approach lies
in its embrace of a Mertonian ideal of science as a communal
enterprise. 59 Those who espouse an open source model for the
communal approach may be reacting to the prevalent view that
increased commercialization and increased competition between labs
delays research. Recent studies indicate that researchers are
increasingly reluctant to share access to published research tools and
will even delay publication
in order to increase their chances of
60
commercialization.
For others, the appeal of an open source approach lies in the
nature of biomedical research in a post-genomic era. Long gone are
the days in which each lab studied one gene or protein at a time.
Today, numerous research tools - from whole genome-based yeast

56. The Free Software Foundation, GNU General Public License Version 2 (June 1991),
http://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/gpl.txt.
57. Open Source Initiative, The BSD License, http://www.opensource.org/licenses/bsdlicense.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
58. Nadan, supra note 51, at 361. The license in its entirety reads:
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification,
are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: Redistributions of
source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the
following disclaimer. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. Neither the
name of the <ORGANIZATION> nor the names of its contributors may be used
to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific prior
written permission.
Id. Note that the third clause was deleted in its entirety on July 22, 1999. The BSD License,
supra note 57.
59.

See Rai, Open & Collaborative Research, supra note 51, at 136 (discussing how

biomedical research may or may not fit a Mertonian ideal).
60. Id.
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two hybrid experiments to gene chips and mass spectroscopy
technologies - enable scientists to study the effect of one gene or
protein on the entire genome or proteome. Such experiments result in
extensive data collections that are more valuable when shared
between various research groups, because such sharing enables

researchers to identify networks of genes or proteins that function in
concert. 6 1 For these biomedical researchers, the ability of major
sequencing centers, throughout the world, to work in concert to

complete a sequence map of the human genome stands out as a
success story.62

In addition, the Human Genome Project (HGP) illustrates a
desire on the part of biomedical researchers to ensure that some basic
information remains accessible to the public.63 This desire partially
stems from the use of federal funds to promote research.64
Accordingly, many researchers believe that federally funded research
results are a public good and should be widely available to the
public. 65 Another part relates back to the Mertonian ideal: as a
66
communal enterprise, the information should be accessible to all.
In addition, commentators and scholars concerned about the
existence of an anticommons or a patent thicket in biomedical fields
advocate an open source approach as a partial solution.67 Under this
61.
See id. at 136-37 (describing how complex diseases often require coordinated
approaches of multiple labs).
62.
For example, the Human Genome Project was funded through the U.S. Department of
Energy, the National Institutes of Health, the Wellcome Trust, in addition to contributions from
Japan, France, China, Germany and other countries. Human Genome Project Information,
http://www.oml.gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/home.shtml
(last visited Nov. 12,
2006). In fact, even the pharmaceutical giant Merck helped to fund the HGP in order to ensure
that information remained available to the public. Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the
Public Domain, 71 U. CHt. L. REV. 183, 188 (2004) [hereinafter Merges, A New Dynamism];
Human Genome Project & the Private Sector, Congressional Hearing Explored Controversies,
Benefits of Public Genome Project,
http://www.oml.gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/project/privatesector.shtml (last visited
Nov. 12, 2006).
63.
For a detailed discussion of the battle to ensure that publication of the sequence of the
human genome was widely available, see Eliot Marshall, Sharing the Glory, Not the Credit, 291
SCIENCE 1189 (2001), availableat http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/fullI291/5507/1189.
64.

See Mueller, supranote 31, at 222-23.
65.
See Rai, Open & Collaborative Research, supra note 51, at 132. See also Dan L.
Burk, Open Source Genomics, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 254, 256 (2002).
66.

See Rai, Open & CollaborativeResearch, supra note 51, at 136.

67.
See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 698 (finding that anticommons are likely
minimized in close-knit communities); Rai, Open & CollaborativeResearch, supra note 51, at
132; Rai, ProprietaryRights, supra note 6, at 292; Matthew D. Satchwell, The Tao of Open
Source: Minimum Action for Maximum Gain, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1757, 1763-64 (2005)
(discussing software rather than biotechnology).
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view, an open source approach represents one mechanism to reduce
transaction costs. 68 The belief is that placing information in the69public
domain may avoid the likelihood of an anticommons problem.
C. Open Source Biology NecessarilyDiffers From Open Source
Software
As discussed previously, the open source movement arose in the
context of software and copyright. However, biotechnological and
pharmaceutical
development is not analogous to software
development.70 Whereas most software development is funded
through the private sector, the U.S. government funds the majority of
basic research in biology, chemistry and bioinformatics software
development. 7' Furthermore, biological research costs substantially
more on average than software development, given the substantial
72
infrastructure necessary to conduct experiments. Accordingly, the
lab-intensive nature of much of biotechnology means that the
implementation of an open source approach will face issues not
present in software design. Nevertheless, significant aspects of
biotechnology, such as genome sequencing, are easily amenable to
open source development. 73 Other aspects of biotechnology may
require a more creative approach.7 4
Most importantly, because patents, not copyrights, protect
biological research, biomedical open source licenses must take care
not to run afoul of patent law. Since patent law does not include an
independent inventor defense, mere publication of potentially
patentable results can aid in preventing an anticommons.75 Publication

68.
Stephen M. Maurer, Arti Rai & Andrej Sali, Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is
Open Source an Answer?, I PLoS MEDICINE, 183, 184 (2004).
69.

See Merges, A New Dynamism, supra note 62, 186.

70.

For some commentators, analogizing the hacker culture to biomedical researchers

goes too far. See generally David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin's Genome, or Coase and Open
Source Biotechnology, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167 (2004) (arguing that open source principles

do not readily apply to biomedical research).
71.

See Rai, Open & CollaborativeResearch, supranote 51, at 140.

72.
73.

See Rai, ProprietaryRights, supra note 6, at 297-98.
See infra Section IV.A.2.

74.

See infra Section IV.B.

75.

Copyright recognizes

an independent inventor defense because it is primarily

concerned with expression of ideas. "[I]f by some magic a man who had never known it were to
compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an "author," and if he copyrighted it,
others might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats's." Sheldon v. MGM
Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, J.).
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76
or § 102 (b) 77 bars and pre-empt the
could trigger the § 102(a)
78
invention.
an
of
patenting
Unlike copyright, patent rights last only twenty years from
filing, 79 although the patent term may be extended under particular
circumstances. 8° Thus, given the shorter length of the intellectual
property right, open source licenses on biotechnology inventions must
not fall prey to patent misuse. 81 In particular, licensors should take
care not to license a patent beyond its term. 82 Licensors should
condition the royalties on the patent term or should license something
more than simply a naked patent.83
84
Open source licensing complicates the patent misuse analysis.
When open source licenses require that improvements must be freely
distributed to others, the license seems to contain a grant-back clause.
Grant-back licenses are those in which a licensee must give the patent

76. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
77. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
78. For example, firms losing a race to patent may engage in strategic publication,
thereby altering the prior art. Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926,
927 (2000). Thus, the winning firm's patent may no longer be novel or may be obvious in light
of the publication. Id. Moreover, because the losing firm has published, anyone can use that
information, without obtaining a license since it is in the public domain. Parchmovosky argues
that preemptive publication promotes economic efficiency in the biotechnology industry. Id. at
930-31. However, Rebecca Eisenberg points out that preemptive publication must occur one
year prior to the patent application date to be effective. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Promise and
Perils of Strategic Publication to Create PriorArt: A Response to ProfessorParchomovsky, 98
MICH. L. REV, 2358, 2360 (2000) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Promise and Perils]. In order to
successfully defeat a patent through strategic, preemptive publication, the publication must be
enabling; consequently, many firms would rather file their own application instead of making an
enabling disclosure. Id. at 2362. However, for chemical and biological compounds, publication
of the compound is sufficient to prevent future patents on the compounds themselves. Id. at
2362-63. Thus, DNA publication helps to clear the field of future compound patents, although
utility patents may still issue. However, utility patents are not likely to increase transaction costs
to the same extent as compound patents.
79. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
80. 35 U.S.C. §§ 155-156 (2000); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New
Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICs 717, 722-23, 726-30 (2005) [hereinafter
Eisenberg, New Uses] (detailing policies that extend the patent term).
81.
Copyright misuse is much less of a concern since the copyright term is approximately
life of the author plus seventy years now. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
82. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964); cf Scheiber v. Dolby Lab., 293 F.3d
1014, 1019 (7th Cir. 2002) (criticizing reasoning of Brulotte).
83. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 265 (1979).
84. To date, no courts have weighed in on whether any aspect of open source licensing
constitutes misuse (I searched Westlaw's all feds database using "open +3 source /p misuse" and
obtained zero results). See also Robin Feldman, The Open Source Biotechnology Movement: Is
It Patent Misuse?, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 117, 142 (2004).
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holder rights in products developed by the licensee.85 In the open
source licensing of software, copyleft clauses represent a particular
form of a grant-back: the copyleft provision requires granting back
any improvements to the public. 86 Depending on the license terms, the
inventor-licensee may no longer have the right to practice her
improvement without paying a royalty. 87 However, in the patent
context not all grant-back clauses constitute patent misuse. In
Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co.,88 the
Supreme Court considered the situation where a licensee grants the
patent holder a royalty-free license to use the improvement. 89 The
Court held that, although the agreement extended the patent term,
because it did not diminish the incentive to innovate, the agreement
failed to constitute patent misuse. 90 In addition, courts decline to find
patent misuse where a licensee assigns the rights to the improvement
to the patent holder, but reserves rights to use the improvement
royalty-free. 91
In addition to grant-back clauses, many commentators have
decried the use of reach-through licensing provisions.9 2 Such
provisions often attach when a patent holder licenses a research tool
and claims rights in any invention developed with the tool.93 Reachthrough licensing clauses might constitute patent misuse because the
patent holder uses her rights in one claimed technology to 94obtain a
return on an invention falling outside the scope of her claims.
85. Id. at 153. Such rights may be limited only to those covered by the claims or may
extend to improvements in the general subject area. Id.
86. See Nadan,supra note 51, at 368-69.
87. Feldman, supra note 84, at 154.
88. Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
89. Id. at 646.
90. Id. at 646. But see Int'l Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 166 F. Supp. 551, 565
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (stating that licensee must demonstrate actual stifling of innovation to
constitute misuse).
91.
See Feldman, supra note 84, at 154.
92. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 699-700; Rai, ProprietaryRights, supra
note 6, at 292 (describing problems with upstream proprietary rights impinging on downstream
research).
93.
Feldman, supra note 84, at 157-58. Initially, the patent holder of the polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) attempted to use reach-through provisions to capture products developed
through the use of PCR, but downstream users balked. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 37, at
699.
94. See Michelle Cai, Madey v. Duke University: Shattering the Myth of Universities'
Experimental Use Defense, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 192 (2004) (citing Gerald J.
Flattmann & Jonathan M. Kaplan, Licensing Research Tool Patents, 20 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 945, 945-46 (2002)); Michael J. Stimson, Damages for Infringement of
Research Tool Patents. The Reasonableness of Reach Through Royalties, 2003 STAN. TECH. L.

286

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J.

[Vol. 23

IV. BIOMEDICAL RESEARCHERS EMPLOY CURRENT OPEN
SOURCE APPROACHES
To address the problem of neglected diseases, two open source
approaches are possible. First, in some areas, researchers need
incentives to promote particular domains of research in order to spur
later innovation. Some open source biology approaches that aim to
stimulate research depend on copyright protection; thus, open source
software licensing strategies may apply without any modification.
However, some open source biology projects use strategic publication
to further unfettered access to research results. 95 The first and second
sections detail these approaches to stimulate research. Here, open
source biology preserves more information in the public domain than
would be possible absent the open source approach.
Second, once basic research has developed to the point that
target molecules have been identified and product development needs
to be stimulated, a different open source licensing strategy must be
employed. Similar to open source licensing in software, these
biomedical approaches use patent licenses to preserve freedom to
operate for select parties and aim to reduce transaction costs. The
final section details two different licensing approaches: the first
targets the access gap and the second targets the research gap. This
section concludes that the best method of decreasing transaction costs
to address the access and research gaps is to create patent pools that
can be licensed without owing any royalties.
A.

CurrentApproaches Employed To Stimulate Research

This section concentrates on two current open source biology
approaches: those based on copyright and those based on patents.
1. Open Source Biology Projects Premised Upon
Copyright May Stimulate Research
Two popular types of open source biology projects based on
copyright protection are open source publication and bioinformatics
tools. These projects explored in further detail in this subsection.

REv. 3,
45 (2003), http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/03_STLR_3/ (arguing that such
liability should be premised on whether royalties accrue on subject matter outside the patent
claims and whether any resulting anticompetitive effects outweigh the benefits of exclusion).
95. See infra Section IV.A.2.
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a. Open Source Publications
Traditionally, researchers relinquish the copyright in their
scientific articles to the publisher who organizes the peer review and
copyedits the article.9 6 Subsequently, the publishers then sell the
journal to libraries and individuals at prices that range from enough to
recoup their cost to prices that yield up to thirty percent profit. 97 Thus,
the public pays for access to research that was federally funded by
paying an additional fee. 98 This publishing model restricts access to
most research. In a particularly ironic case, the Director of the
Wellcome Trust attempted to view an article describing work done by
99
one the Trust's grant recipients and could not access the article.
Recently, however, scientists and policy makers advocate that
l00
federally funded research should be widely available to the public.
Although this call for freer publishing does not stem from concerns
about access for the developing world, the developing world benefits
from such approaches. Any effort that makes scientific information
readily available without payment of subscription fees will improve
and provide rapid access to existing information upon which
researchers may build. To stimulate downstream research and
promote research by developing-country researchers, publishers must
change their publication model: 10' they must formulate policies that
lower the costs of publishing and subscribing to scientific journals.

96.
Robert Terry, Funding the Way to Open Access, 3 PLOS BIOLOGY 364 (2005),
http://biology.plosjoumals.org/perlserv/?request=get-document&doi= 10.1371/

joumal.pbio.0030097.
97. Id. Moreover, because most researchers now access journal articles from their
institution's library via the Internet, they are completely shielded from the price. Consequently,
journals have been able to raise their price in some cases by over 200% in the last ten years. Id.
98. See
Public
Library
of
Science,
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
http://www.plos.org/about/faq.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006), for more information about the
restrictiveness of traditional scientific publishing. Most of this research is only available in large

university libraries that restrict the public's access to their materials. In addition, because
researchers use public funding in order to produce their articles, many see the fees charged by
scientific publishers as an additional tax to the public. See also Open Letter by Harold E.
Varmus, Patrick 0. Brown & Michael B. Eisen, http://www.plos.org/about/letter.html (last
visited Nov. 12, 2006). Nearly 34,000 researchers signed on to the letter in which the authors
and signatories pledge to only publish, edit, peer-review, and personally subscribe to journals
that grant public access within six months of publication through major scientific databases.
About Public Library of Science, http://www.plos.org/about/index.html (last visited Nov. 12,

2006).
99.
100.

Terry, supra note 96, at 364.
See About Public Library of Science, supra note 98.

101.

Cell

Press

charges

for

color

figures.

Cell,

Information

http://images.cell.com/images/EdImages/Inforation%20for/2OAuthorsPDF2.pdf

for

Authors,

(last visited

Nov. 12, 2006). The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) charges fees
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BioMedCentral, an independent publisher, was the first
organization to publish biology journals using the ideals of the open
source community. 10 2 However, not all the articles available through
its website are freely available to the public. 10 3 Among those journals
that BioMedCentral publishes that address access and promote drug
development in underserved areas are Orphanet Journal of Rare
BMC Infectious Diseases,
Diseases, Filaria Journal, Malaria Journal,
10 4
and BMC Journal for Equity in Health.
In 2003, The Public Library of Science (PLoS) joined the open
10 5
source community by founding its own scientific journals.
Currently, PLoS publishes six journals in which peer-reviewed
articles are freely available on the Internet.' 0 6 The two most important
PLoS journals for researchers focused upon developing world health
are PLoS Pathogens and PLoS Clinical Trials. PLoS Pathogens
publishes research papers on a range of pathogens, including
Trypanosomes, HIV, and Ebola. 10 7 PLoS Clinical Trials will focus on
reporting the results 08of clinical trials in order to provide reliable
evidence of efficacy. 1
Both PloS and BioMedCentral protect their articles through a
Creative Commons Attribution License'0 9 and both support their

depending on the length of the article: $70 per page; $200 per article for supporting information;
and an additional $1,000 to provide open access of the article to the public during the first six
months after publication. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Information for
Authors, http://www.pnas.org/misc/iforc.shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
102. Press Release, BioMed Central, Science Publishing - Beginning of a Revolution
(Apr. 26, 1999), http://www.biomedcentral.com/info/about/pr-releases?pr= 19990426.

103. BioMed Central, What Is BioMed Central?,
http://www.biomedcentral.com/info/about/whatis (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
104. See BioMed Central, Subject Areas,
http://www.biomedcentral.com/browse/bysubject/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
105.

About Public Library of Science, supra note 98.

106. Public Library of Science, Journals, http://www.plos.org/joumals/index.html (last
visited Nov. 12, 2006).
107. See Public Library of Science Pathogens, Current Table of Contents,
http://pathogens.plosjoumals.org/perlserv/?request-index-html&issn

1553-7374 (follow "Table

of Contents" hyperlink for the current issue) (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
108. See Public Library of Science, Clinical Trials,
http://clinicaltrials.plosjoumals.org/perlserv/?request-index-html&issn=1555-5887
Nov. 12, 2006).

(last visited

109.
Public Library of Science, License, http://www.plos.org/
journals/license.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006); BioMed Central, Copyright and License
Agreement, http://biomedcentral.com/info/about/license (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). Thus,

under the Creative Commons Attribution License employed by both organizations, the license
specifies that, subject to particular restrictions, the
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publishing efforts by charging authors for publication. 110 However,
both organizations recognize the importance of publishing the work
of researchers in the developing world by waiving publication fees
based on need. 1 1
Free access to articles, especially in journals devoted to
underserved research areas, represents a significant step towards
promoting drug development. Indirectly, open source publishing
promotes research into neglected diseases and addresses the access
gap. First, free journal access enables researchers to devote more of
their grant money to research rather than to purchasing journals.
Ensuring the efficient use of grants is crucial, especially when
research funding for neglected diseases currently lags behind the
research grants for diseases that are prevalent in the developing
world. Second, free access to information helps to bypass research
impediments. The more information that is publicly available to
apply, the less time researchers and innovators need to spend
negotiating complex licensing agreements. Finally, by waiving
publication fees for researchers in developing countries, these
journals promote research in the countries directly affected by
neglected diseases.1 2 Local researchers are likely more familiar with

Licensor hereby grants [the licensee] a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive,
perpetual (for the duration of the applicable copyright) license to exercise the
rights in the Work as stated below: (a) to reproduce the Work, to incorporate the
Work into one or more Collective Works, and to reproduce the Work as
incorporated in the Collective Works; [and] (b) to create and reproduce
Derivative Works;...
Id. The license includes that any copies or derivative works made include notice of the license,
that the licensee may not alter the terms of the license to restrict other uses of the work. Id.
110.
BioMedCentral, Frequently Asked Questions About BioMed Central's ArticleProcessing Charges, http://www.biomedcentral.com/info/about/apcfaq (last visited Nov. 12,
2006); Public Library of Science, Publishing Model, http://www.plos.org/journals/model.html
(last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
111.
BioMedCentral, Frequently Asked Questions About BioMed Central's ArticleProcessing Charges, supra note 110 ("Individual waiver requests will be considered on a caseby-case basis and may be granted in cases of lack of funds."); Public Library of Science,
Publishing Model, supra note 110 ("A 'no questions asked' fee waiver exists for authors who do
not have funds to cover publication fees. In addition, editors and reviewers have no access to
authors' payment information, and hence inability to pay will not influence the decision to
publish a paper. These policies ensure that the fee is never a barrier to publication.").
112.
A discussion of whether developing countries should spend significant amounts of
money to develop endogenous research programs is beyond the scope of this Paper.
Nonetheless, I believe that if the developing world is to become part of the developed world, its
population must create endogenous industries and take advantage of the wealth of talent that
currently is wasted rather than simply consuming goods from the developed world. For an in
depth look at this issue (not centered on pharmaceuticals), see T-Shirt Travels (PBS television
broadcast), a documentary. Summary available at PBS, T-Shirt Travels,
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the course of the diseases, how local populations cope with diseases,
and how best to use the local public health system to get drugs to the
population. Thus, while both publication models acknowledge the
importance of uniform access to scientific information as a tool to
increase access to technologies, PLoS is more explicit in its
endorsement of access for those in developing countries.' 3
b.

Open Source Bioinformatics

Similar to traditional software development, with the rise in
genome sequencing and analysis, programmers developed a variety of
bioinformatics tools based on open source models, such as BioJava."14
Thus, BioJava is distributed under the Lesser GPL, or LGPL, which
enables traditional, or non-'free", software to link with open source
software in order to establish a de facto software standard.' 15 By using
open source licensing, programmers provide low-cost informatics
tools to the entire scientific community. While many of the
bioinformatics tools are available for free,' 16 at least one company
offers bioinformatics tools and value-added activities "to increase 7the
utility and effectiveness of open source bioinformatics" for a fee."
Many of the researchers who modify open source bioinformatics
software are university researchers." 8 Consequently, these researchers
must also consider whether the technology transfer policies of their
home institution are compatible with open source licensing. 1 9 For
example, in order for Professor Steven Brenner at UC Berkeley to
participate in an open source bioinformatics project, he was forced to
negotiate with the university in order to have the right to distribute his
work freely.' 20 Some university technology transfer offices
aggressively pursue patent rights, so researchers may be prohibited
from developing future informatics tools through modifying current

http://www.pbs.org/independentlens/tshirttravels/film.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
113.

See Public Library of Science, Publishing Model, supra note 110.

114.
Examples of such software include BioPerl, BioJava, Biopython, BioRuby. Feldman,
supra note 84, at 128.
115.
Id. at 129; Open Source Initiative, GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1
(Feb. 1999), http://www.opensource.org/licenses/lgpl-license.php.
116.
For example, BioJava may be downloaded at no cost. See BioJava, Download,
http://biojava.org/wiki/BioJava:Download (last visited Nov. 12, 2006.
117.

Electric Genetics Corp., Open Source, http://www.egenetics.com/opensource.html

(last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
118. See Rai, Open & CollaborativeResearch,supra note 51, at 146-47
119.

Id.

120.

Kenneth Neil Cukier, Open Source Biotech (2003),

http://www.cukier.com/writings/opensourcebiotech.html.
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open source code. Thus, for such researchers, open source
bioinformatics only enables them to save money: if no open source
software was available, they would be forced to purchase higher
priced commercial products. However, these problems may not be
widespread, because, to date, most technology transfer offices have
been more concerned with acquiring12patent rights to biotechnological
inventions than software inventions. '
2.

Open Source Biology Data Repositories That Are
Based Upon Patents May Stimulate Research

As discussed previously in the context of open source
publication, access to data itself stymies research efforts because
researchers and innovators build on existing knowledge. Thus, the
rise in the numbers of proprietary databases threatens the pace and the
content of future research. 22 Researchers with smaller budgets will
not be able to purchase access to proprietary databases.
Consequently, researchers have pushed for the creation of
federally funded and widely accessible databases. Furthermore,
researchers often voluntarily place research results into such open
source data repositories.123 In addition to functioning as a check on
the power of proprietary databases, by placing information in the
public domain, researchers engage in strategic publication. 24 The

121.

Stanford has pursued patents on software more aggressively than other research

universities. See DAVID C. MOWERY, RICHARD R. NELSON, BHAVEN N. SAMPAT & ARVIDES A.
ZIEDONIS, IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT 108 (Martin Kenney & Bruce Kogut eds.,

2004) (describing Stanford's practices with regard to software).
122. By proprietary databases I mean databases that restrict access in any way. Most of
these base access on payment of a fee. Recent proprietary databases developed include efforts
by Celera and Incyte. Although Celera has changed its business model, it still maintains

proprietary

genomic

databases.

See

Celera Genomics,

Applera

Genomics

Initiative,

http://www.celera.com/celera/appleragenomics (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). Incyte has
abandoned the genomic database business. See Incyte, http://www.incyte.com/ (last visited Nov.

12, 2006) (highlighting Incyte's new focus on drug-development).
123.
Those who would rather not contribute to a public repository are often forced to do so
by the publications requirements of scientific journals. See Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences Information for Authors, supra note 101; Science Magazine, General
Information for Authors, http://www.sciencemag.org/about/authors/prep/gen info.dtl#datadep

(last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
124.

Under 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000), "a person shall be entitled to a patent unless (a) the

invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent[.]" Although to date, there are no cases in which internet references have been considered
printed publications, information widely available on the internet should qualify as "known ...

by others."
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purpose of strategic publication is to prevent patents on the same or a
similar discovery. Consequently, the use of strategic publication
represents an open source approach as it ensures that resources remain
available to a wide segment of the population. This section will
consider two representative types of data repositories: sequence
databases and community-centered databases.
a. Sequence Databases
DNA sequence databases represent one resounding open source
success. During the sequencing of the human genome, any new
genomic sequences (greater than 1KB) identified by participants had
126
25
within twenty-four hours.
to be deposited in Genbank1
Consequently, the Human Genome Project (HGP) prevented Celera
from patenting significant portions of the genome. Ultimately,
Celera's genome database business failed. 127 Similarly, Merck's Gene
Index Database, a publicly accessible database containing over
800,000 gene sequences, represents the efforts of a large
pharmaceutical company to pre-empt patents on gene sequences and
ensure freedom to operate for itself and everyone else.1 28 Thus, the
existence of publicly available databases containing genomic
information has helped to reduce the threat of the anticommons and
done so by taking an open source approach.
Similarly, the threat of patents led to an international public
project with the HapMap. 29 The International HapMap project aimed
to develop and publish an analysis of the polymorphisms (specific
sites at which DNA sequences varied) and their linkages in different
human genomes. 130 The HapMap is based on the finding that groups
125. Genbank is the NIH nucleotide database containing sequences from a variety of
organisms, including humans. Genbank Overview,
http://www.ncbi.nih.gov/Genbank/index.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
126.
See Rai, Open & Collaborative Research, supra note 51, at 141, 157 n. 52; John
Sulston, Heritage of Humanity, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Dec. 2002,

http://mondediplo.com/2002/12/15genome (describing the agreement that became known as the
Bermuda Principles). Part of the rationale of this practice was not only to stimulate research but
to ensure that raw sequences could not be patented. See Eisenberg, Promise and Perils, supra

note 78, at 2363-64. Many of the genome annotation projects take the same approach. Rai, Open
& CollaborativeResearch, supra note 51, at 17.
127.

Rai, Open & CollaborativeResearch, supra note 51, at 147-48.

128.

Merges, A New Dynamism, supra note 62, at 188. Intriguingly, in terms of strategic

preemption, in both the case of the HGP and Merck, it was the party lagging in the race to
sequence that dedicated the information to the public. See Eisenberg, Promise or Perils, supra

note 78, at 2364-65.
129.

See Merges, A New Dynamism, supra note 62, at 190 n.22.

130.

International HapMap Project, The Responsible Use and Publication of HapMap
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of single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) 13 1 along a chromosome
are inherited in blocks. In the late 1990s, the French biotechnology
firm Genset began filing patent applications on SNPs. 132 If any
patents issued on SNPs that were associated with particular genes,
any other firm wishing to research such a gene would be forced to
negotiate a license (or licenses if there were multiple SNPs) to invent
a therapy to treat the disease linked to that gene.1 33 Thus, a group of
private firms and non-profit institutions banded together to form the
SNP consortium to pre-empt an anticommons in SNPs. 134 The
International HapMap Project grew out of this effort.
Like the HGP, participants in the HapMap Project agreed to data
release principles to ensure that information is publicly accessible
shortly after it is generated. 35 Unlike sequence information generated
through the HGP, HapMap researchers must initially register for
access to the HapMap Database and "must agree not to reduce others'
access to the data and to share the data only with others who have
made the same agreement." 136 This data access policy explicitly states
that the goal is to ensure that the data remain in the public domain.
The policy is designed to ensure rapid access and further development
of products based on information contained in the database. 137 Thus,
registration includes agreeing to a non-exclusive license to access the
database. Therefore, the HapMap Project more closely follows
traditional open source software ideals by using a licensing strategy to
maintain the availability of information for all to use. Once haplotype

Data, http://www.hapmap.org/guidelines hapmapdata.html.en (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
131.
SNPs are essentially single nucleotide differences that occur every 100 to 300
nucleotides. dbSNP Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/projects/SNP/gethtml.cgi?whichHtml=faq
2006).
132.

Merges, A New Dynamism, supra note 62, at 189.

133.

Id. at 189-90.

(last visited Nov. 12,

134.
Id. at 190. dbSNP does not permit researchers to deposit information to the database
with a request to withhold it from the public; thus, it is immediately publicly available. dbSNP
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 13 1.However, initially the SNP Consortium did not
adhere to the Bermuda Rules. Eisenberg, Promise & Perils, supra note 78, at 2365. Instead, the
Consortium employed Statutory Invention Registration (SIR) specially to enable the identified
SNPs to be used as prior art while maintaining the earliest possible priority date while
preventing other companies from using the SNPs in the mean time. Id. at 2365-66.
135.
See International HapMap Project, The Responsible Use and Publication of Data,
supra note 130.
136.
International HapMap Project, Data Release Policy,
http://www.hapmap.org/datareleasepolicy.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).
137.
International HapMap Project, The Responsible Use and Publication of Data, supra
note 130.
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blocks (sets of detailed SNPs that are inherited together) are derived,
the Project contemplates that registration will no longer be required
because a non-registered researcher will not be able to appropriate
information from the database with her own research in any effort to

obtain a patent. 138
b.

Community-CenteredDatabases

Beyond genome-based databases, communities of researchers
have pooled their knowledge to create open source communities on
the web that centralize their research results. 39 Many of these
communities are built around model genetic organisms: Drosophila
(Flybase), C. elegans (Wormbase), and Mus musculus (Mouse
Genome Database). 140 Of these online communities, Flybase
explicitly prohibits commercial gain based on the use of the material
contained within its pages.141 In contrast, Wormbase states
"[p]ermission to use the information contained in this database was
given by the researchers/institutes who contributed or published the
an explicit disclaimer prohibiting
information.' ' 42 Without
commercial gain, researchers may be able to profit from information
deposited in Wormbase. None of these databases requires
membership, thereby keeping their resources available for the
scientific community at large.
Community databases enable researchers to quickly explore the
links among genes, proteins, mRNAs, phenotypic data, RNAi data,
microarray data, and many other types of experiments. These

138.

International HapMap Project, About the HapMap,

http://www.hapmap.org/thehapmap.html.en (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
139.
See e.g., John E. Sulston, The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 2002, C.
elegans: The Cell Lineage and Beyond, Nobel Lecture at Sal Adam, Berzeliuslaboratoriet,
Karolinska Institutet (December 8, 2002), in LES PRIX NOBEL 363, 377 (2002), available at

http://nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/medicine/laureates/2002/sulston-lecture.pdf.
140.
Rachel A. Drysdale, Madeline A. Crosby and The FlyBase Consortium, FlyBase:
Genes and Gene models, 33 NUCLEIC ACIDS RESEARCH D390 (2005), available at

http://flybase.bio.indiana.edu/docs/commercial.local/fb-nar05-doc.pdf;
Wormbase,

http://www.wormbase.org/

(last

visited

Nov.

12,

2006);

Mouse

Genome

Informatics, http://www.informatics.jax.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). Other model organism
databases are listed at Wormbase, Other Model Organisms,
http://www.wormbase.org/about/mods.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
141.
The Copyright of Flybase, http://flybase.bio.indiana.edu/docs/lk/copyright.html (last
visited Nov. 12, 2006). The Genetics Society of America holds the copyright in Flybase. Id
(last
142.
Wormbase, Copyright Statement, http://www.wormbase.org/copyright.html
visited Nov. 12, 2006). California Institute of Technology, Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory,
Washington University at St. Louis, and The Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute together hold the

copyright in Wormbase. Id
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databases stimulate the pace of scientific research by reducing the
time researchers spend acquiring information and by substantially
reducing search costs. Furthermore, community databases enable new
types of experimentation. For example, for C. elegans, one research
lab collected all the available microarray data in the database to create
a topological gene expression map. 43 From this data, these
researchers were able to identify DNA sequence motifs that control
expression of groups of co-expressed genes. 144 Recent proposals for
open source biology build on the community-center approach45 by
calling for a web-based collaboration among volunteer scientists.
Accordingly, model organism-based communities serve as
models for disease-specific communities. Some web-centered
communities already exist for a number of neglected diseases. For
example, several inter-linked sites exist to promote access to
information and reagents for malaria.1 46 The Sanger Center, in
collaboration with the Wellcome Trust, has established a
Leishmaniasis genome project and associated database as part of its
Pathogen Genome Initiative.14 All data from these projects are freely
and immediately available online, thus following the standard set by
the HGP.

Stuart K. Kim et al., A Gene Expression Map for Caenorhabditis elegans, 293
143.
SCIENCE 2087 (2001).
See Yueyi Liu, Serafim Batzoglou & Stuart K. Kim, Genome-wide Discovery of DNA
144.
Regulatory Motifs in C. elegans, http://cmgm.stanford.edu/-kimlab/motifs/index.html (last
visited Nov. 12, 2006).
See Maurer et al., supra note 68, at 183-84.
146.
See Malaria Research and Reference Reagent Resource Center (MR4),
http://www.malaria.mr4.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2006); Multilateral Initiative on Malaria
(MIM), http://www.mim.su.se/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2006); PlasmoDB, The Plasmodium
Genome Resource, http://www.plasmodb.org/plasmo/home.jsp (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
MR4 is sponsored by the National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases and seeks to
disseminate reference standard reagents to ease the burden of distribution on individual
laboratories and to improve the speed of research and to foster open and collaborative
communities. See Background and Purpose of MR4,
(last visited Nov. 12, 2006). MIM
http://www.malaria.mr4.org/generalIbackground.html
consists of an alliance of organizations with malaria. It aims to maximize the impact of scientific
research against malaria in Africa, through capacity building, global collaboration, and global
coordination. About MIM, http://www.mim.su.se/english/about/index.html (last visited Nov. 12,
2006). PlasmoDB contains tools to research the available genomic information relating both to
Plasmodium and its mosquito vector. Plasmo DB, Queries & Tools,
145.

http://www.plasmodb.org/plasmo/queries-tools.jsp (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
147.
Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute, The Leishmania major Friedlin Genome Project,
http://www.sanger.ac.uk/Projects/Lmajor/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2006); Wellcome Trust Sanger
Institute, Pathogen Sequencing Unit, http://www.sanger.ac.uk/Projects/Pathogens/ (last visited
Nov. 12, 2006).
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Together, these data repositories help to provide researchers
around the world with more tools and information that, if not freely
available, would not likely exist in these forms just described. These
open source concepts help to decrease transaction costs in gaining
access to information. In addition, they result in lower research costs,
because less information is solely controlled by commercial entities.
Although these open source concepts may stimulate research in areas
that are not profitable for traditional drug companies, research alone
will not lead to drug development. Incentives must be developed to
build upon basic research and develop new medicines. Open source
approaches to this problem are addressed in the next section.
B. Licensing Strategies That ProvideIncentives To Promote
Drug Development And Access To Existing Drugs.
Currently, two major licensing strategies have developed to
improve access to drugs or to stimulate new drug development. The
approach advocated by Universities Allied for Essential Medicines
relies on universities to reserve rights to enable developed drugs to be
produced and marketed in the developing world. 14 8 It calls its
approach a "self-binding commons" appropriating language from the
open source movement. 149 The other major approach, taken by
CAMBIA/BiOS, is modeled more closely on the open source
software movement.' 50 This section analyzes the enforceability of
these licenses and then explores whether they will likely promote
drug development. In conclusion, the CAMBIA approach is likely to
motivate more drug research and development than the approach
taken by the Universities Allied for Essential Medicine, because the
CAMBIA approach more effectively decreases transactions costs.
1. The Equitable Access License
Universities Allied for Essential Medicines (UAEM) seeks to use
the rights that universities already possess to create a "self-binding
commons" to ensure that the developing world has access to essential
drugs.15 1 Thus, they envision a system in which university technology
transfer offices (TTOs) license a patented invention to a commercial

148.

See infra Section IV.B.I.

149.

See infra Section IV.B.1.

150.

See infra Section IV.B.2.
Kapczynski et al., supra note 1, at 1090. While this article is not officially authored

151.

by Universities Allied for Essential Medicines, the lead author is one of the co-founders of
UAEM.
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entity that successfully turns that invention into an approved drug.
They advocate including clauses in those licenses that ensure that the
university retains rights to guarantee freedom to operate in low- or
middle-income countries for any products that result from the
collaboration. 52 The university then grants a non-exclusive license to
third parties to provide the approved drug to a low-income or middleincome country.153
Accordingly, the Equitable Access license must contain a grantback provision, which gives the university rights in the product
developed by the commercial entity and possibly require a crosslicensing strategy as well. 54 The licensee grants back to the university
a license to "the Associated Licensee Rights for the sole purpose of
granting Open Licenses... to Supply in accordance with Section
3.a.'5 155 The Associated Licensee Rights encompass "all rights in data,
information, know-how, methods, procedures and processes,
including patent and marketing rights, possessed by [the] Licensee...
necessary to make, use, sell, offer to sell, import or export an End
Product" including a wide range of scientific and clinically-relevant
information. 56 In order to publicize the terms of the Equitable Access
License, the licensee may be required to include a statement in any
patent application stemming from the licensed technology that
the
57
patent is subject to the terms of the Equitable Access License.
Should other commercial entities wish to produce the drug for
the benefit of a low- or middle-income country, those entities must
notify the university and the commercial entity that was originally
granted a license. 158 Because there are no restrictions on who may
receive an Open License, anyone can be a Notifier.' 59 In order to
152.

Id. at 1094. The model license is available at Universities Allied for Essential

Medicines, Model Provisions for an "Equitable Access and Neglected Disease License" Version

1.0, http://www.essentialmedicine.org/EAL.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2006) [hereinafter Model
License]. The actual licenses proposed by UAEM divide the issue into two parts: equitable
access and neglected disease. Id. The definition of neglected disease parallels the definition of
an orphan disease. Id. § 1 .h.I will focus on the equitable access license.
153.
Model License, supra note 151, § 3.
154.
Kapczynski et al., supra note 1,at 1094. The cross-license might be necessary where
the licensee possesses rights that it could assert to block third parties from producing the laterdeveloped product. Id. at 1094 n.286.
155.
Model License, supra note 151, § 2.
156.

Id. § l.b.

157. Id. § 2.
158. Kapczynski et al., supra note 1, at 1095. These third parties are termed Notifiers.
Model License, supranote 151, § I.m.
159. Model License, supra note 151, § 1.n ("There are no limitations on... the parties
whom [sic] may receive an Open License.").
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practice the technology, the third-party Notifier must inform both the
university and the Licensee of its intent to supply the drug in a low- or
middle-income country, and upon such notification, the Notifier
automatically receives an Open License.' 60 The Open License entitles
the Notifier a non-exclusive right to the relevant technology from
61
both the university and from the original Licensee.'
The following subsections explore the license from the
standpoint of the Notifier, the industry licensee, and the university.
a. There Are Both Pros And Cons Of The Equitable
Access License From The Notifier's Point Of View
The Equitable Access license aims to reduce costs associated
with licensing for the Notifier. First, the Notifier need only pay a Fair
Royalty payment, the size of which is dependent on whether the
Notifier produces the product for sale in a low- or middle-income
country. 162 Thus, the fair royalty payments range from two percent of
net sales in a low-income country to five percent of net sales in a
middle-income country.' 63 Presumably, these royalty rates are
significantly lower than rates the Licensee might agree to without the
Equitable Access license. Second, the Notifier receives rights without
having to negotiate licenses with the university and/or the Licensee.
Consequently, the notification procedure decreases the transactions
costs inherent in negotiating such a complex license. The rights
64
granted by the license are perpetual and irrevocable.
However, the lack of a term limit may lead to allegations of
patent misuse. Although the agreement clearly envisions that the
Licensee will provide additional information necessary to produce a
drug to the Notifier, the royalties owed do not depend either on a
fixed amount of time, such as the patent term, or on the continued
validity of the patent. 65 Consequently, under Aronson,166 should the
Notifier seek to challenge the validity of the agreement, courts may
160.

Id. § 3.a.

161.

See id § l.n (defining Open License). The Open License includes a license to the

licensed technology ("the rights licensed by the University to the Licensee") and the associated
licensee rights (the information developed by the Licensee based on the licensed technology).
See id. §§ l.a, lb.
162.
Id. § 1.f. Although the agreement defines a Notifier Fee, nowhere does the Model

License require payment of a Notifier Fee in order to obtain the Open License. Id. § l.k.i-iii.
163.

Id. § I.f. The low- and middle-income designations are based upon the World Bank

classification of countries. Id.
164.

Id. § 3.b.

165.
166.

See id § lf.
See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
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infer patent misuse, despite the underlying social policy of promoting
access to medicines. 167 Thus, for clarity, it would be best to alter the
license terms to include a term that runs with the length of the patent.
Adding such a term would also prevent the unenforceability of the
168
license in Japan or Belgium, where perpetual licenses are illegal.
Alternatively, if the Notifier actually receives know-how from the
Licensee, the Notification form should state this fact. Such written
conformation can help to prevent courts from inferring patent misuse.
The aforementioned problems with the Equitable Access license
can be remedied by improving the terms of the license. But the key
question is whether the license actually provides the proper incentives
to parties to achieve their goals of promoting health worldwide. These
licenses are explicitly premised on the idea that universities hold key
patents for blockbuster drugs. 16 9 However, outside the Stavudine
case, 170 it is still unclear whether universities hold significant numbers
of similarly valuable patents that could be leveraged to provide broad
access to medicine. It is also uncertain whether Notifiers will be able
to take advantage of university-held patents.
Although studies support that university research directly
impacts innovation in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical
sectors,' 7' this connection is not as strong as Kapczynski, Chaifetz,
Katz, and Benkler claim. At first glance, it appears that universities
produce research that spurs the biotechnology and pharmaceutical
industries. Managers queried in studies of sources of industry research
indicated that university research was a source for new biotechnology
drugs. 172 In one study, forty percent of pharmaceutical
respondents
73
indicated they relied on university-generated research. 1
However, biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies may not
be relying primarily on patented university discoveries. A recent

167.
See id. at 264.
168.
Communication from Christian Nadan, Associate General Counsel for Sun
Microsystems, in Intellectual Property Transactions, October 4, 2005, at UC Berkeley, Boalt
Hall.
169.
Dave A. Chokshi, Improving Access to Medicines in Poor Countries: The Role of
Universities,3 PLoS MEDICINE 723 (2006).
170.

See Kapczynski et al., supra note 1, at 1034-37.

171.
See MOWERY ET AL., supra note 121, at 28-29 (describing studies of connections
between university and industry innovation).
172. Id. ("Managers interviewed in the... study, however, differentiated between
pharmaceuticals based on biotechnology and other drugs, stating that university research rarely
was the source of new drugs not based on biotechnology, for which the key work took place in

industry.")
173.

Id. at 32.
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study of the top academic research institutions assigned the largest
number of DNA patents indicates that, despite this proclaimed
dependence on university-based research, biotech and pharmaceutical
companies may not be relying on patents but on information derived
from published research, conferences, and other fora. 174 The study
found that, the 2,607 patents managed by the survey respondents were
associated with only 1,200 license agreements. 928 patents were
either not administered or never licensed and 50% (or 1301) of the
studied patents were licensed only once. 175 Thus, only 14% of these
DNA patents were licensed more than once. 176 Not all of the singly
licensed patents in the 177Pressman study represent traditional
"exclusive" licensing deals.
Although the survey by Pressman and her colleagues did not
focus on the revenue generated by exclusive or quasi-exclusive
licenses, data from the Association of University Technology
Managers (AUTM) do not paint a rosy picture.17 8 The survey reports
net license/option income received of $1.385 billion by its nearly 200
respondents in 2004.179 However, only 167 out of 27,322 active
licenses, or 1.5% of all licenses/options, generated greater than $1
million for the owning institution. 80 These licenses are not limited to
medically relevant technology-however one defines it-and the data
include licenses on invention disclosures. 81' Thus, one can safely
assume that the percentage of licenses that actually possess
commercial value for medical applications that could benefit the
developing world is far smaller. Accordingly, although the
notification procedure could improve access to medicines in the
developing world, it appears that few key patents are likely

174. See Lori Pressman, Richard Burgess, Robert M. Cook-Deegan, Stephen J.
McCormack, lo Nami-Wolk, Melissa Soucy & LeRoy Walters, The Licensing of DNA Patents
by US Academic Institutions: An Empirical Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 31, 31-37

(2006).
175.

Id. at 35, 37 Fig. 4.

176.
Id. (2607 studied patents - (928 never licensed/maintained patents + 1301 one time
licensed) = 378 patents licensed more than once).
See id. at 37 (explaining that of 308 of these patents chosen for further study, only
177.
173 were exclusive in all fields of use).
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING
178.
SURVEY: FY 2004 SURVEY SUMMARY (Ashley J. Stevens, Frances Toneguzzo & Dana Bostrom
eds., 2005), available at http://www.autm.net/events/File/04AUTMSurveySum-USpublic.pdf.
179.

Id. at 24-25.

180.

Id. at26.

181.

Id. at 15-16, 21.
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university-owned, thus decreasing the potential number of drugs to
which this license could apply.
Furthermore, it is imperative that the terms of the license do not
discourage any commercial development of new drugs, because few
university-owned patents meaningfully contribute to drug
development and production. The Equitable Access approach could
stifle innovation, if biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies
refrained from licensing university-held patents. These issues are
explored in the next subsections.
b. The Terms Of The Equitable Access License Are
Unattractive To Industry
The Equitable Access License contains unattractive terms that
may dissuade industries from seeking licenses from university under
these terms. Because anyone can be a Notifier, an industry Licensee
may be forced to transfer its technology and know-how to a direct
competitor in the developed world. 82 Although it is unlikely that a
direct competitor would seek notification rights, as currently
formulated, the Licensee has no right to prevent a competitor from
acquiring rights.
Of potentially greater issue is that a Licensee does not have a
strong remedy to combat a Notifier that breaches the agreement. For
example, what happens if the Notifier sells the drug outside low- or
middle-income countries and begins to decrease the Licensee's
market share? The license envisions that a Notifier may "exercise its
right to make" a drug in any country, although it may only export
such drug to low- and middle-income countries. 8 3 However, the
"Notifier shall use reasonable efforts to visibly distinguish the [drug]
sold [sic] distributed by the Licensee in the country of manufacture,
but such reasonable 84 efforts do not require Notifier to expend
significant expense."'
The Licensee will not be mollified by the inclusion of this
clause. Should the Notifier fail to take any effort to visibly distinguish
the product, the license does not provide specific remedies in the
182.

Kapczynski et al. envision that generic companies, government agencies, and non-

governmental organizations would be most likely to use the notification procedure, but there is
nothing to stop a large pharmaceutical company from obtaining rights. See Kapczynski et al.,
supra note 1, at 1103. A large pharmaceutical company might do so to improve its public image
by providing low-cost drugs to the developing world or to discover more about a competitor's
process or procedure to produce that particular drug.
183.
Model License, supra note 151, § Lk.
184.

Id. § 3.a.
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license itself for either the Licensee or the University. 185 The Licensee
will likely not possess standing to sue the Notifier for infringement,
because the licensee does not hold all substantial rights in the patent
allegedly infringed.18 6 Furthermore, the Licensee cannot sue for
breach of contract, because there is no contract between the Licensee
and the Notifier. To compound the problem, the Licensee will never
feel secure, because as long as the Notifier pays a Fair Royalty, the
license is irrevocable and perpetual. 8 7 Consequently, the Licensee
must shoulder the risk of a breach of the Notification agreement until
the Notifier ceases to pay royalties.
c.

The Inclusion Of EquitableAccess Terms In
Licenses May Lead To DecreasedRevenue And
FutureLicensing Agreements For Universities

Many of the terms of the Equitable Access licenses are
unattractive to universities as well. First, the inclusion of Equitable
Access terms may complicate licensing negotiations, for the reasons
described above. Consequently, inclusion of equitable licensing
clauses may result in fewer licenses or may impact the available
royalties obtained.
Second, should the Notifier breach the agreement, only the
university will have standing to sue, as the patent owner. If the
Notifier exported the drug to the developing world but also supplied a
significant amount of the drug to a low- or middle-income country,
the university may be reluctant to sue the Notifier due to the bad
publicity the university might face. Moreover, if the university chose
to sue, such an action could result in the invalidation of the patent.
The university would lose its revenue stream from that particular
patent, as would the licensee. Consequently, the licensee might be

185.

This situation is somewhat analogous to problems that impede the acceptance of

indication splitting licensing practices. See Roger Longman, The New Out-Licensing Start-Ups:
Securing Product Supply, START-UP, Dec. 2005, at 14, 15-16. Many start-up biotechnology

companies may find indication splitting a way to ensure that they receive some income from a
drug while investigating further possible uses of that drug to treat other indications. However, it

is difficult to workout a framework in advance to address how payments should be shared when
doctors prescribe the drug for an off label use that falls within someone else's indication under
the license. See id.
186. Because the pharmaceutical company would not be an exclusive licensee, it would
lack standing to use. See Aspex Eyewear, Inc., v. E'lite Optik, Inc., No. 04-1292, 2005 U.S.
App. LEXIS 4803 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 24, 2005) (non-precedential opinion).
Model License, supra note 151, § 3.b. The licensee cannot even protest any alleged
187.

infringement because, under the license, neither the university nor the licensee must accept the
royalty. Id.
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reluctant to license future patents or technology from the university.
Thus, the lack of a remedy for a Notifier breach may place the
university in an untenable situation and affect future licensing
negotiations.
Third, most university technology transfer offices already
reserve rights for non-profit institutions to carry out research using the
patented technology.1 88 In the study by Pressman and her colleagues,
the nineteen Technology Transfer Offices ("TTOs") that the
researchers contacted all indicated that they insist on retaining
research-rights for themselves that they may transfer to other
nonprofit institutions.1 89 These findings beg the question of whether
the Equitable Access License necessarily promotes drug development
and access to existing drugs. 190 While this license would help to
provide the developing world access to existing drugs that target
diseases also afflicting the developed world, it fails to provide
incentives to commercialize new products. However, for universities
that possess patent rights for potential drugs, the Equitable Access
License promotes development of those potential drugs, ensuring the
pharmaceutical company exclusive .marketing of any products in the
developed world. 19 1
2.

The CAMBIA/BiOS Licenses

In contrast to the approach advocated by UAEM, CAMBIA-the
Center of Applications of Molecular Biology to International
Agriculture-an independent, non-profit research institute in
1 92
Australia, advocates open source licenses based on patent pools.
Although CAMBIA's mission centers on agricultural tools, its
Biological Innovation for Open Society (BiOS) initiative applies open

188.

See Pressman et al., supra note 174, at 35.

189.

Id.

190.
Given the development of the Institute for OneWorld Health, a non-profit
pharmaceutical company that has ties to both biotechnology companies (Amyris
Biotechnologies) and UC Berkeley, it would seem that institutions and companies can develop

their own licensing strategies to address the research gap. Institute for OneWorld Health,
http://www.oneworldhealth.org/index.php (last visited Nov. 12, 2006); Amyris Biotechnologies,
New Technology for Global Health, http://www.amyrisbiotech.com/projects.html (last visited

Nov. 12, 2006). Such approaches may be more desirable, despite the increased transaction costs,
because parties can ensure to protect their basic rights more effectively than a Notification
system allows.
191.
Model License, supra note 151, § l.k (granting Notifier rights only to develop drugs
in the lower and middle-income countries).
192.
See generally,CAMBIA, Business Model: The Power of Open Source,
http://www.cambia.org/daisy/cambia/about-cambia/593.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006).
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source concepts to its patent pool approach and licensing strategy that
applicable to the development of medically relevant
would be equally
93
products.
This section first details BiOS's approach to open source
licenses. Second, this section analyzes if the licenses are effective of
as licenses. Finally, this section addresses whether the approach of
BiOS addresses concerns of the downstream research problem.
a.

The BioS Approach To Open Source Licenses
Contains Numerous Benefits To Remedying Access
And Research Gaps.

BiOS currently offers licenses to Genetic Resource Indexing
Technology (GRIT) and Plant Enabling Technology (PET). 194 The
GRIT license covers diversity array technologies. 195 The PET license
covers transformation and regeneration of plant tissue and betaglucuronidase genes and proteins and their uses. 196 Because these
licenses are quite similar, this portion of the paper primarily discusses
the GRIT license and, where appropriate, points out unique elements
of the PET license.
The license grants a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free right
to make and use the inventions covered by the patents and to any
associated know-how "for the purpose of developing, making, using,
and commercializing BiOS Licensed Products and Services without
obligation to CAMBIA."' 97 Furthermore, the licensing strategy
193.

In addition, CAMBIA reports that they are developing a health initiative license. See

CAMBIA's Health Initiative, http://www.cambia.org/daisy/cambia/l 188 (last visited Nov. 12,

2006).
194.
1.3,

The CAMBIA BiOS License for Genetic Resources Indexing Technologies Version

http://www.bios.net/daisy/GRITLicense/750/l170.html

(last

visited Nov.

12,

2006)

[hereinafter GRIT License]; The CAMBIA BiOS License for Plant Enabling Technology
Version 1.3, http://www.bios.net/daisy/PELicense/751/1169.html

(last visited Nov. 12, 2006)

[hereinafter PET License]. These are complex licenses and I do not intend my discussion of
them to cover the entire scope of the licenses.
195.

GRIT License, supra note 194, Annex A.

196.

PET License, supra note 194, Annex A.

197.
GRIT License, supra note 194, § 2.1. One important difference between the GRIT
and PET Licenses is that the GRIT license cannot be sub-licensed. Compare id. with PET

License, supra note 194, § 2.1. Although the license provides for worldwide use, the GRIT
technology is subject to a pending patent application (TransBacter technology specifically) in
the U.S. and a PCT filing covering the 0-glucuronidase (GUSPIus) technology in the U.S.,
Australia, New Zealand, with additional pending applications in Canada, Australia, Brazil,
Europe, and Israel. For the PET technology, patents have issued in the U.S., New Zealand and

Australia and applications are pending in Brazil, Canada, Europe, and Mexico. However, given
the inclusion of know-how that could be contributed by licensees anywhere in the world, the

worldwide scope of the license seems reasonable. BioForge, BiOS Licensed Patents Inventory,
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envisions that licensees will cooperate and share information, and
CAMBIA facilitates these interactions by maintaining a list of
licensees on its website.198

In return for the right to use the BiOS patents and know-how, the
license includes a grant-back clause, giving CAMBIA a worldwide,
non-exclusive, royalty-free, fully paid-up license to any improvement
patents or any improvements. 99 The latter are defined as any
improvement to the BiOS patents or associated know-how "made or
discovered by or for" the licensee or any party to whom the licensee
granted a sublicense:
comprising - without limitation - methods, compositions, know-

how, statistically significant or repeatable observations, or
protocols, which [sic] 1. improves [sic] or increases the
effectiveness, efficiency, applicability, or value of the [BiOS
patents and know-how] from which it is derived, or 2. but for the
terms of this License Agreement cannot be used
without infringing
200
a valid claim in an unexpired Licensed Patent.
However, if a licensee made such a discovery prior to licensing
or maintained it as a trade secret, it is exempted from the definition of
an improvement. 20' But a licensee may contribute any other of its
proprietary technology as an improvement.20 2 The BiOS licenses
require that a licensee report any improvements, including copies of
filed improvement patents, and provide CAMBIA with sufficient
amounts any improvement materials necessary to practice any
improvement. 20 3 Furthermore, licensees are estopped from asserting
any improvement patents against CAMBIA or any other licensees. 204
Thus, the BiOS approach explicitly creates a patent pool. A
patent pool may consist of a simple agreement between two parties to
license one or more of their individually-held patents to each other or
a third party or as complex as groups of patent holders assigning or
licensing their rights to a central entity that exploits the collection of

http://www.bioforge.net/forge/entry.jspa?externallD=153&categorylD=5 (last visited Nov. 12,
2006).
198. GRIT License, supra note 194, § 2.3. The list of licensees is only available to other
licensees, not to registered members of the BiOS website.
199. Id. § 3.1.
200. Id. § 1.5.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. § 3.2.
204. Id. § 3.1.2. Improvement patents are any patents or plant variety protection
applications that claim an improvement. Id. § 1.6.
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rights.2 °5 In a traditional pool, the central entity then divides up the
royalties "according to the value attributed by the parties to their
Patent pools provide an effective
respective patent claims ....
mechanism by which transaction costs are lowered.2 °7 Although
patent pools have run afoul of anti-trust law in the past, in 1995,
Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice promulgated IP
Licensing Guidelines that state that IP pooling is pro-competitive
where "(1) it integrates complementary technologies, (2) reduces
transaction costs, (3) clears blocking positions, (4) avoids costly
infringement litigation, and (5) promotes the dissemination of
technology., 208 Here, the patent pool created is shared without an
imposition of royalty payments.
In addition to the aforementioned licenses, BiOS licensees must
execute a Technology Support Services Agreement. 20 9 The agreement
210
is part Material Transfer Agreement and part Fee Agreement.
CAMBIA agrees to make all licensed information accessible and aims
to provide all licensees with notification and detailed descriptions of
any new Improvements available under the terms of the License. 21 1 In
return, the licensee must provide sufficient quantities of an
improvement material to enable CAMBIA to supply other licensees
and to make a long-term back-up supply. 21 2 The Agreement also
mandates that licensees immediately share with BiOS data relevant to
safety, regulatory approval, or in-house reports. 3 The agreement
205. JEANNE CLARK, JOE PICCOLO, BRIAN STANTON & KARIN TYSON, UNITED STATES
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT POOLS: A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? 4 (2000),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf;

Robert P. Merges, Contracting

into Liability Rules: Intellectual PropertyRights and Collective Rights Organizations,84 CALIF.

L. REV. 1293, 1340 (1996) [hereinafter Merges, Liability Rules].
206. Merges, Liability Rules, supra note 205, at 1340 (quoting StandardOil Co. v. United
States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931)).
207.
Id.
208.

CLARK ET AL., supra note 205, at 6.

209. See GRIT License, supra note 194, § 1.8. The PET license includes a similar clause;
however, the embedded link to the Technology Support Services Subscription Agreement is
broken. Accordingly, my discussion will focus on the one associated with the GRIT license.
BiOS GRIT Technology Support Services Suscription Agreement Version 1.3,
http://www.bios.net/daisy/GRITLicense/1416/143 l.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2006)
[hereinafter Subscription Agreement].
210. Subscription Agreement, supra note 209, §§ 2, 3.
211. Id. § 2.1.
212. Id. § 2.2. Improvement materials might include new vectors, bacteria expressing any
newly developed DNA sequences and vectors, etc.
213. See id. at § 2.3; see GRIT License, supra note 194, § 1.12 (defining Technology
Data). However, information maintained as confidential by a licensee is not available to other
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specifically states that the providing party owns any materials
provided under the license.2 14 However, under the agreement, a BiOS
licensee has the right to commercialize or otherwise exploit any
215
product derived from contributed materials.
BiOS contemplates that, in consideration for the license and the
other services provided through the license, each licensee will pay
CAMBIA a subscription fee based on "the number of employees in
the fields of plant biotechnology and plant breeding.
,216 But
"academic, not-for-profit organizations" need not pay a fee. 2 17 Highincome countries with commercial entities of greater than 500
employees are charged $150,000 per year; commercial entities with
fifty to 500 employees are charged $50,000 per year; and commercial
entities with between five and forty-nine employees are charged
$10,000 per year.218 Commercial entities in non-OECD countries are
encouraged, instead of paying a fee, to support BiOS through in-kind
contributions. 219 After three years, the Agreement may be terminated
independent of the license agreement; thus, commercial entities need
only pay for three years of use of BIOS materials. 220 However, if a
licensee seeks to obtain available improvements, she must sign a new
Agreement and re-commence payment. 221
b. The BiOS Licenses Diminish Transactions Costs
More than the EquitableAccess License
Like the Equitable Access License, the BiOS licenses risk patent
misuse, because they fail to state a term and do not decrease the
subscription fee for expired patents. But, as previously discussed, the
clear provisions here, including know-how and materials with the
license grant, make any risk of patent misuse less likely.
Unlike the Equitable Access License, the BiOS licenses decrease
transaction costs for all licensees. First, the standardized licensing
licensees, unless the licensee provides written consent prior to disclosure. Subscription
Agreement, supra note 209, § 2.5.
214.

Subscription Agreement, supra note 209, § 2.9.

215.

Id.

216.

Id. § 3.1.

217.

Id. § 3.2. I quote the particular language used because it appears to exclude non-

academic, non-profit organizations from the fee waiver. To my mind, this arrangement is
counter to the BiOS ethos of developing tools and products to benefit health.

218.

Id.§ 3.1, Annex D. High income is defined by membership in the Organisation for

Economic Co-operation and Development. Id.
219.

Id. Annex D.

220.

Id. § 4.1.

221.

Id. § 5.
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approach (also employed in the Equitable Access license) obviates the
need for negotiations, thereby decreasing cost. Second, the BiOS
approach creates a patent "plus" pool. The creation of a patent pool
benefits all licensees because the licensees receive know-how
necessary to practice the invention. By receiving information relevant
to practicing the invention, fellow licensees will spend less money
and effort in repeating others work. Paradoxically, the cost savings
through the patent plus pool is achieved through grant-back
provisions. 222 However, unlike traditional grant-back clauses, in
which the party who developed a new invention based on the licensed
223
technology gives up some of her right to possess the technology,
here, the grant-back is leveraged to create a patent pool for the benefit
of all researchers in the field.
Through these patent pools, the BiOS licenses may promote
downstream research and alleviate the anti-commons and patent
thicket concerns. By providing a one-stop shop for a group of
biotechnology rights, research entities may obtain the necessary
licenses with minimal transaction costs. Furthermore, by licensing
groups of rights necessary to practice particular technologies,
blocking patents and royalty-stacking issues are minimized. Although
some believe that commercial entities will not participate in patent
pooling in biotechnology, 224 CAMBIA's approach ensures, at the very
least, the research tools essential to practice in agricultural
biotechnology will remain available for all to use at low cost.225 Given
that much of the anticommons concerns arise over the patenting of
research tools, 22 6 CAMBIA's approach leverages patent law while
keeping the commons open.

222.

See supra Section III.C.

223.

See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.

224.
Sandra Schmieder, Scope of Biotechnology Inventions in the United States and in
Europe-Compulsory Licensing, Experimental Use, and Arbitration:A Study of Patentabilityof
DNA-Related Inventions with Special Emphasis on the Establishment of an Arbitration Based
Compulsory Licensing System, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 163, 224-226
(2004).

225.
Because the names of BiOS licensees are available only to other licensees, it is
difficult to determine whether commercial entities are currently licensing from BiOS. However,
in the associated BioForge, which enables discussion groups, Richard Jefferson, the founder of
BiOS, stated that they had closed the first major license with a "major multinational
corporation." See Posting of Richard Jefferson to
http://www.bioforge.net/forge/thread.jspa?messageID=514&#514

(Sept. 2, 2005, 17:23). Thus,

it appears that industry will participate in open source licensing of patent pools.
226. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 37, at 699. In fact, Heller and Eisenberg
recognize that patent pools might help to allay the concerns they raise. Id. at 700.
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One further advantage of CAMBIA's system that could aid in
promoting downstream research is that nothing in either the licenses
or the agreement prohibits any licensee from commercializing the
technology it receives from CAMBIA. Many argue that the
exclusivity provided by patents is crucial to enable companies to
bring a product to market. However, it is not clear whether, if a new
drug target was known and covered by BiOS technology, that no
company in the world would agree to develop it as a drug. Since
most, if not all, of the necessary rights to practice the invention were
already within the patent pool, the entity might have already paid for
three years of use and may owe CAMBIA no further revenue.
Consequently, use of CAMBIA's system might actually decrease the
costs necessary to bring that new drug to market. Moreover, because
the licenses and agreement clearly contemplate that all licensees will
share any relevant information needed to meet regulatory standards, 2 7
the costs of clinical trials may even be diminished.
However, while the ability to share all this information is
beneficial, companies that desire to develop products from BiOSlicensed technologies must confront the free-rider issue. For example,
it is unclear whether a licensee-company that had developed a drug
would need to share all its clinical trial data with the other
licensees. 28 If information sharing is required, then any other licensee
could potentially submit the data to another regulatory agency to
obtain approval for the drug in question. However, if the drug
qualified for orphan status in the U.S., then the commercial entity
229
would be entitled to seven years of market exclusivity in the U.S.
As a result, companies that choose to develop such drugs may turn
out to be nonprofits in order to minimize these free-rider concerns.
For example, the March of Dimes developed the polio vaccine
without resorting to patenting.2 30 Therefore, should a similar public
health concern develop and a potential cure could only be found
under licensing conditions similar to BiOS, it may be that a nonprofit
like the Gates Foundation would provide sufficient funding to enable
production of such a crucial drug.

227. See Subscription Agreement, supra note 209, § 2.
228. See id. § 2.3. The pharmaceutical industry has long maintained that clinical trials are
trade secrets of the company that undertook the trial. See Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 80, at
736.
229. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(b)(2) (2000).
230. See Maurer et al., supra note 68, at 185.
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V. SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES OF OPEN SOURCE
BIOLOGY EXIST OVER OTHER POSSIBLE
ALTERNATIVES TO PROMOTE ACCESS TO DRUGS
Thus far, this article has assumed that an open source model
provides better options than other methods to achieve increased
access to medicines. This section compares open source licensing to
alternatives proposed by others and concludes that, in contrast to
other proposed alternatives, an open source approach represents a
currently implemented, politically viable solution to the access and
research gaps.
A.

The Alternative Approach Of Compulsory Licensing
Provides FewerBenefits Than The Open Source Model.

The licensing models discussed previously, rely on voluntary
participation. In contrast, within a compulsory licensing system, the
government either mandates that patents be compulsorily licensed or
a party petitions the government to compel a patent owner to grant
licenses to other parties.2 3 1 Although the patent holder would receive
compensation for the compulsory license, the leading argument
against such licensing practice is that it is difficult to quantify the
amount of compensation. 32 Given that patents promote the exclusive
233
right to make, use, sell, offer to sell, or import into this country,
critics argue that compulsory licensing defeats the goals of the patent
system to reward innovation.2 34
In spite of these criticisms, Americans have pushed for
compulsory licensing of drugs in the name of public health.23 5
Compulsory licenses can be implemented in the U.S., and they would
not necessarily violate our obligations under the TRIPs agreement.2 36
Under TRIPs, compulsory licenses may be authorized if there is a
' '237
The
national emergency or "circumstance[s] of extreme urgency[.]

231.

Mueller, supra note 31, at 231-32; Schmeider, supra note 224, at 212, 217-19.

232.

Mueller, supra note 31, at 232.

35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
See, e.g., Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the
234.
Compulsory Licensing of PharmaceuticalsHurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 856
(2003).
See Rep. Dennis Kucinich, Remarks to the House on Compulsory Licensing of
235.
Tamiflu (Nov. 16, 2005), in 151 CONG. REC. E2374, availableat
233.

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?position=all&page=E2374&dbname
2005_record.
236.

Mueller, supra note 3 1, at 232.

237.

Chien, supranote 234, at 869-70.
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Doha Declaration states that member countries decide "what
constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency. ' 238 Thus, the U.S. would have to define circumstances of
extreme urgency abroad that were sufficient to invoke the compulsory
licensing power inherent in TRIPs.
Not only does the U.S. seem unlikely to construe extreme
urgency so broadly, but also if compulsory licenses were invoked,
239
they would alter incentives to invest in research and development.
For example, pharmaceutical companies might invest more money in
developing life-style drugs over drugs that target life-threatening
diseases to avoid the threat of compulsory licenses. In the U.S. and
Europe, existing markets for life-style drugs are so large and
lucrative, pharmaceutical companies would likely continue to
generate large profits under such circumstances. Even if some of the
life-style drugs had multiple uses that were subject to compulsory
licensing, the presence of such multiple uses would probably not deter
companies from continuing to shift research priorities towards lifestyle over life-threatening drugs. Accordingly, it is highly unlikely
that the U.S. would240 push for a regulatory system including
compulsory licensing.

Furthermore, only existing drugs can be subject to compulsory
licensing. Compulsory licenses cannot increase the amount of
research to find drugs to address neglected diseases; they can only
address the access gap.
Thus, given that Congress has been reluctant to include
compulsory licensing provisions in any revision to the patent law,
open source approaches are more likely to be able to address the
access issue because they do not rely on the political system to
achieve an effect. Of course, the fact that participation is purely
voluntary is a limitation that the nascent open source biology
movement will have to address if it is ever to achieve its goals.

238.

Id.at 871.

239.

Schmeider, supra note 224, at 223. However, I do not mean to imply that compulsory

licenses are or will never be used in the U.S. See id at 223-24 (discussing areas of U.S. law in
which compulsory licenses have been considered). In fact, see infra note 240 for situations in
which compulsory licenses have been imposed.
240. Compulsory licenses on drugs have been granted in two contexts: under 28 U.S.C. §
1498 (2000) and under antitrust consent decrees. Chien, supra note 234, at 867-68. Under §
1498, the U.S. government made and used tetracycline and meprobamate. Id. at 868. Under

antitrust consent decrees, tetracycline, ampicillin, and related antibiotics were compulsorily
licensed from Pfizer, American Cyanamid and other pharmaceutical companies. Id.
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B. The Eminent Domain Approach Also Provides Fewer
Benefits Than The Open Source Model
One commentator analogized compulsory licensing to the
government's exercise of eminent domain and argued that, when
public health demands it, the government could step in to
manufacture the necessary drug.241 Indeed, in such circumstances, the
government owes the patentee only a reasonable royalty and is not
liable for patent infringement.2 42 Recently, the government
contemplated such action during the anthrax scare, but declined to
exercise its eminent domain power.243
In the event of an immediate public health crisis in the U.S., the
government might exercise eminent domain with the support of the
public if the brand-name manufacturer could not meet demand.
Although eminent domain would increase the tax burden for the
public, taxpayers likely would likely be willing to pay for treatments
for anthrax, bird flu, or SARS. In such a dire situation, the
government might approve contracts for several competing
companies to produce the necessary treatment. The public would
either buy the treatment directly from pharmacies or the government
could purchase the treatment directly from the manufacturers and
distribute it to the public. With a large volume contract and no need to
pay the costs to develop the drug, prices probably would be
significantly less than what the original manufacturer charged. Thus,
the U.S. public would experience much greater access to the
necessary treatment.
However likely the aforementioned scenario may be, the
government is not likely to use eminent domain to ensure that the
developing world has access to patented drugs, even in the face of a
public health crisis. The government is unlikely to risk antagonizing
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies in the U.S. on behalf of
the developing world. In addition, use of eminent domain for the
benefit of the developing world might lead such companies to shift
their research and development programs away from treatments that
would be subject to eminent domain, which would be a detriment to
the public at large.244

241.
242.
243.
244.

Mueller, supra note 31, at 234.
28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2000).
Mueller, supra note 31, at 234.
See supra Section V.A for a more full discussion of this issue.
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C. The March-In Rights Approach ProvidesLess Access To
Medicines Than The Open Source Model
Under the Bayh-Dole Act, the government retained a right akin
to both a compulsory license and eminent domain to step in to
practice an invention not exploited by an owner who developed the
technology with federal funds. 245 The Act aimed to encourage
universities and small businesses to patent inventions made with
government funding.2 46 Much has been written about the successes
and problems that adhere to the Act. 247 However, little ink has been
spilt over the ability of the government to "march-in" when a patentee
or licensee fails to satisfy "health or safety" needs for the simple
reason that, to date,
the government has never taken advantage of its
"march-in" right. 248
Moreover, it is not clear whether health or safety needs
encompass the needs of people outside the U.S. Most likely, if the
government were to exercise its "march-in" rights, it would be for the
benefit of those living in the U.S. In addition, as described earlier,
even if the government wished to use these rights, it is not clear that
they apply to most inventions.2 49 Thus, even if the U.S. exercises its
"march-in" rights at some point, these rights are insufficient to
provide access to medicines to those in the developing world.
D. The BroaderExperimental Use Exemption Approach Offers
Fewer Benefits Than The Open Source Model
Foreign patent laws generally permit a limited exemption from
infringement for research activities. 25 Recently, the scope of any
experimental use exemption in the U.S. has been in flux. In 2002, the
Federal Circuit dramatically reduced the scope of the common law
exemption in holding that Duke University's use of a patented
research tool did not necessarily fall within the common law
experimental use exemption. 251 Because Duke University's use
"further[ed] the institution's legitimate business objectives, including
educating and enlightening students... ," this conduct might not be

245.
246.

35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (2000).
Mueller, supra note 31, at 234-35.

247.

See, e.g., MOWERY ET AL., supranote 121.

248.
249.
250.
251.

See Mueller, supra note 31, at 235.
See discussion supra Section IV.B. 1.
Mueller, supra note 31, at 236.
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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construed as non-commercial.252 In 2005, the Supreme Court, in
Merck v. Integra Lifesciences,253 broadened the statutory exemption
for experimental use. 254 Thus, under Merck, "all uses of patented
inventions that are reasonably related to the development and
submission of any information under the FDCA" fall under the
exemption set out in § 271(e)(1). 2 5 Prior to Merck, it was unclear
whether the exemption for experimentation on patented invention
only applied to experiments that were used in seeking regulatory
approval under the FDCA.256 Accordingly, university researchers who
experiment on a patented invention or use a patented invention to
develop a new product or tool are likely to be liable for infringement
if sued. But, commercial entities that are in the process of developing
a drug may experiment on a patented compound with immunity.
Currently, it might seem that the expansion of the statutory
exemption for experimental use may provide enough incentives to
promote downstream research that could benefit the developing
world. However, given the current focus of the pharmaceutical
industry, most likely such immunized research will center on making
the next generation of Viagra. Because most of the drugs in the
marketplace today are designed to manage the illnesses of the
developed
world,2 57
experimentation
on currently
patented
compounds will lead mostly to production of similar compounds,
which will neither benefit orphan diseases nor provide access to
medicines for the developing world.
E.

The Open Source Approach Provides More Incentives To
Improve Access and Research Gaps Than The National
Biotechnology DatabaseApproach

Instead of open source biotechnology, David Opderbeck
proposes a national biotechnology database (NBTD). 258 The most
critical aspect to promote innovation in biotechnology, in his view, is

252.

Id. at 1362.

253.

Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).

254. Id. at 202.
255. Id.
256. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000); George Fox, Integra v. Merck: Limiting the Scope
of the § 271(e)(1) Exception to Patent Infringement, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 193, 193-94
(2004) (describing how courts had broaden its applicability beyond the narrow scope articulate
in the Hatch-Waxman Act).
257. See Kapcyzski et al., supra note 1, at 1037 (stating that ten percent of the world's
R&D budgets are spend on illnesses that result in ninety percent of the global disease burden).
258. Opderbeck, supra note 70, at 224.
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increasing access to data by instituting a database of existing rights. 59
The NBTD would centralize information to promote efficient
licensing and lowered transaction costs. Such a database would
require information concerning the technology, its associated IP
260
rights, pricing information, and licensing term information.
Institutions would choose to participate, although all institutions
would be required to submit information describing the technologies
26 1
they possess.
Thus, the NBTD addresses fears of an anticommons problem by
attempting to reduce transactions costs by giving all parties access to
the same information, or at least a baseline of information. Opderbeck
believes that the NBTD would lead to lower licensing prices and
royalties due to increased competition.2 62 In addition, by making
license terms and price public, the NBTD might curtail strategic
behavior by increasing market pressure on participants who refused to
license or whose licensing terms were excessive.26 3 Finally, the
NBTD could increase the rate of innovation by serving as a one-stop
shop for venture capitalists looking for their next project.
However, even outside the biotechnology industry, participants
do not often disclose their licensing terms. 264 Thus, it is far from clear
that such a database could attract enough participants to achieve its
goals. Moreover, foundational technology is not subject to the same
market pressures as technologies for which a simple design-around
solution exists.
Finally, it is unclear how an NBTD would improve upon the
current system as a means to provide incentives for pharmaceutical
development to target diseases for which few treatments exist. If no
technologies currently exist to treat a particular disease, no licenses

259.
J.H. Reichman and Paul F. Uhlir have also recognized a similar interest, namely of
creating an open source data center in which federally-funded research data is available to all
and privately-funded data would be available under a Creative Commons license. See J.H.
Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for Scientific
Data in a Highly ProtectionistIntellectual PropertyEnvironment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
315, 426-31 (2003). Their approach mirrors my previous discussion of data repositories.
Because I believe that this kind of open source approach would be difficult to implement and
that many researchers would be vehemently opposed, I have chosen not to discuss it.
260.

Opderbeck, supranote 70, at 224.

261.

Id. at225.

262.

Id.

263.

Id.

264.
In fact, I had a hard time finding all the licensing data that I sought. One of the
benefits of an open source approach is that it improves the ability of all parties to learn ex ante

what licensing terms to expect.

316

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J.

[Vol. 23

can help provide access to the developing world. Furthermore, if a
party could identify particular technologies that may help in
developing a product, an NBTD provides little incentive to parties to
agree to reasonable terms for developing world researchers. Although
the NBTD relies primarily on voluntary behavior, it requires such an
extreme change in scientific norms that parties are not likely to
voluntarily comply. Accordingly, open source approaches provide
more incentives than an NBTD would to improve the access and
research gaps.
VI. CONCLUSION
Disparities in health between the developed and the developing
world have not diminished despite recent advances in the biomedical
industry. While many commentators have argued for or against open
source biology, few have analyzed how current practices may
improve the access and research gaps. Applying traditional,
copyright-centric licenses to scientific journals enables researchers to
allocate their resources more appropriately. Using strategic
publication, participants in genome-related databases have helped to
clear the field of potential patent thickets or anticommons problems.
While these approaches help to stimulate efficient research, they are
insufficient alone to help to bring new drugs to market. Altogether,
voluntary open source licensing of patent pools centered upon
particular technology groups provides the best incentives to promote
downstream drug development. Researchers are more likely to
volunteer their efforts towards such a project, because participation
pays off in the form of decreased transaction costs. Thus, by relying
on voluntary participation, open source biology avoids numerous
obstacles, such as governmental interference and political pressures.

